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The Emergence of Delaware's Good Faith Fiduciary
Duty: In re Emerging Communications,Inc.
ShareholdersLitigation'
I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2004, the Delaware Chancery Court held two directors
of Emerging Communications, Inc. ("ECM") liable for breaching
their fiduciary duties to ECM's minority shareholders.2 At first
blush, the case is surprising, and therefore noteworthy, because of
the sheer disparity between the $10.25 per share price offered to
minority shareholders and the $38.05 per share price the court
found to be more indicative of ECM's value at the time of the offer.3 Yet, despite the magnitude of the directors' monetary liability, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case centers on the
court's imputation of liability for a breach of the duty of good
faith.4 In so holding, the court not only affirmed that a duty of
good faith in fact exists under Delaware corporation law, but also
seemed to position the duty of good faith on a continuum between
the duties of care and loyalty. By hanging director liability on the
duty of good faith, the court has inexorably complicated corporate
governance by bridging the gap between the duty of care and loyalty with the duty of good faith in such a way that may preclude
corporations from seeking directorial guidance from individuals
who are perhaps best suited to proffer such guidance: those with
expert knowledge in the corporation's line of business.
1. No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
2. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. Lexis 70, at *42-43.

3. Id. As a consequence of the court's finding, each director was held liable for $27.80
per share, the difference between $38.05 and $10.25. Id. at *155.
4. Id. at * 143. Technically the court stated that the directors were liable for breaching
their "duty of loyalty and/or good faith." Id. at *146-47 (citing Id. at 142 n.184) (emphasis
added). The court used the and/or phraseology "because the Delaware Supreme Court has
yet to articulate the precise differentiation between the duties of loyalty and of good faith."
Id. at *142 n.184. As the court indicated, the fundamental distinction at issue is whether
"a loyalty breach requires that the fiduciary have a self-dealing conflict of interest in the
transaction itself," or whether "a loyalty breach does not require a self-dealing conflict of
interest or receipt of an improper personal benefit." Id. Regardless of the specific requirements of the duty of loyalty, however, the court concluded that a violation of the duty of
good faith was sufficient grounds to support liability. Id. For a broader analysis of Delaware's "good faith" standard, see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 456 (2004).
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This comment will attempt to chart the emergence of Delaware's fiduciary duty of good faith. After a discussion of the evolution of good faith as an independent standard of director liability
in Delaware corporation law, Emerging Communications will be
analyzed for its articulation of the duty of good faith. Specifically,
the court's holding will be examined to show how and perhaps why
the duty of good faith emerged in Delaware law under the facts of
Emerging Communications.
II. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
Overview: The Contoursof Good Faith

A.

Any discussion of boards of directors' fiduciary duties must start
from the presumption that "the doctrine of []fiduciary relations is
one of the most confused and entangled subjects in corporation
law."5 As one commentator expressed, part of the problem with
understanding fiduciary relations is that "[ciourts and others display confusion concerning the content of fiduciary duty by sometimes muddling the distinction between its two branches, care and
loyalty," when "[tihe two branches actually have little in common."6 In recent years, however, Delaware courts -- particularly
the Delaware Supreme Court -- have further muddied the fiduciary waters by discussing directors' fiduciary duties in terms of a
triad: care, loyalty, and good faith.7 To be sure, not all Delaware
courts have expressed comfort with the newly extant fiduciary
triumvirate, preferring instead the compartmentalization of the
duty of good faith as a subset of one of the other primary duties.8
5.

Carl Samuel Bjerre, Evaluating the New Director Exculpation Statutes, 73

CORNELL L.REV. 786, 788 (1988) (quoting Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F.Supp. 625,
629 (D.Del. 1943)).
6. Id. at 788-89 (footnote omitted); see also William T. Allen et al., Function over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 BuS.LAW.

1287, 1302-03 (2001) (arguing that in some instances care and loyalty claims are reviewed
under the same standard).
7. See, e.g., Emerald Partnersv. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (stating "the directors of Delware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty and
good faith") (emphasis added); see also Cede & Co.v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361
(Del. 1993); but see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standardsof Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV 437, 438 (1993) (stating that

I[tlraditionally, the two major areas of corporate law that involved standards of conduct
have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty").
8. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7,
2001), vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (2001), remanded to No. Civ.A. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437
(Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003) (discussing the duty of good faith as a subsidiary requirement of
the duty of loyalty); see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 449 (recognizing that good faith is
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Still, given recent court decisions, especially that of Emerging
Communications, it appears that a duty of good faith is now a legitimate, independent fiduciary duty, and one in fact strong
enough to impute liability by itself.
Any discussion of directors' fiduciary duties must begin with the
seminal fiduciary case, Smith v. Van Gorkom.9 For the purposes
of discussing the evolution of Delaware's duty of good faith, however, Van Gorkom is less important for what it decided -- that certain directors were personally liable for breaching their duty of
care ° -- than for what it spawned, "the now ubiquitous exculpatory
statute."" The reason for enacting the statute was simple: with
the threat, newly emboldened after Van Gorkom, of personal liability hanging over directors' heads, the only way to attract talented directors was to provide them with a modicum of security
that inhibited courts from scrutinizing the substance of their decisions. 2 As stated, the statute allows corporations to implant in
their charters "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director."13
Importantly, such exculpation or limitation of personal liability
does not extend to breaches of "the director's duty of loyalty," or
"for acts or omissions not in good faith."" While providing timely
usually "treated as an aspect of the duty of care," though he thinks "it is distinct from that
duty").
9. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
10. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864, 893. In reaching its conclusion, the court articulated
the applicable standard of review for alleged breaches of directors' duty of care, stating
"[wihile the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of
care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." Id. at 873 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
11. Sale, supra note 4, at 458; see also Bjerre, supra note 5, at 786. The statute in
question reads in relevant part:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) [flor any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of the law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; (iv) for any transaction
from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
8 DEL. CODE § 102(b)(7).
12. See Sale, supra note 4, at 458; See also Bjerre, supra note 5, at 786.
13. See 8 DEL. CODE § 102(b)(7).
14. Id. (Emphasis added). Section 102(b)(7) also prohibits director exculpation for
breaches under § 174 and "for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit." Id. Section 174 prohibits the unlawful payment of dividends and unlawful stock purchases or redemptions. See 8 Del. Code § 174.
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protection to directors of corporate boards, the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) also unwittingly turned the notion of good faith into
a protean concept, one ultimately capable of sustaining liability on
its own, somewhat elusive terms. 5
B.

Evolution of the Duty of Good Faith:Case

In re Caremark International,Inc. Derivative Litigation" was
perhaps the first significant case to breathe life into the duty of
good faith. Caremark involved a proposed settlement stemming
from claims that "Caremark's board of directors [ breached their
fiduciary duty of care to Caremark in connection with alleged violations by Caremark employees of federal and state laws and regulations applicable to health care providers." 7 The issue for the
court was limited to whether the proposed settlement agreement
between the corporation and its stockholders was fair. 8 While
noting the difficulty involved in holding directors liable solely on
the grounds of a duty of care violation, 9 and ultimately concluding
that no such duty of care breach had occurred, the court nevertheless carved out from its discussion of due care a unique place for
good faith considerations. Notably, the court stated that "compliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision
...apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the
process employed."2" As such, the stupidity or egregiousness of a
board's decision provides no grounds to support fiduciary liability,
"so long as the court determines that the process employed was
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.'
Initially, the court's discussion in Caremark appeared to be
nothing more than reflexive fidelity to the business judgment
15. See Sale, supra note 4, at 464 (stating that "fals a separate duty, good faith can
attach to situations beyond those invoking loyalty concerns and can grow to address its own
category of governance issues").
16. 698 A.2d 959 (Del.Ch. 1996).
17. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960. Pursuant to a plea agreement, "Caremark pleaded
guilty to a single felony of mail fraud and agreed to pay civil and criminal fines" total approximately $250 million. Id.
18. Id. at 961.
19. Id. at 967 (citing Galiardi v. TriFoods Int'l Inc., 693 A-2d 1049, 1051 (Del.Ch.
1996)).
20. Id. Regarding this point, the court made clear that in its opinion this point "may
not widely be understood by courts or commentators." Id.
21. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
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rule," "a process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all
good faith board decisions."23 Still, the court placed special emphasis on the role good faith plays in understanding any director's
duty of care, going so far as to call good faith the "core element of
any corporate law duty of care inquiry." 4 To that end, good faith
is the ingredient that ultimately enables directors to cloak themselves in the protective garb of the business judgment rule, perforce shielding the substance of their business decisions from an
inquiring judicial eye. But by placing good faith at the center of
all duty of care inquiries, the court also created an avenue (arguably the duty of care's Achilles heel) through which the duty of care
ceases to be impenetrable. In particular, the court suggested the
possibility of an independent standard of good faith in its discussion about director care and attentiveness. For the court, "only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight.
. will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition
to liability.2 5 Although dicta, the court's focus on good faith as a
possible source of director liability is unique. Although still articulated as a condition precedent to liability, and not yet an independent standard itself, good faith nevertheless emerges from
Caremark closer to a freestanding duty, "one that creates its own
incentives for fiduciaries to make thoughtful decisions ex ante and
that regulates, in part, abdication of the fiduciary's role"26 than it
was before Caremark. Beyond that, the court in Caremark recognized clearly that the business judgment rule, and the presumptive immunity it affords directors, ultimately rises and falls on the
fortuitous wave of good faith. 7 In short, absent good faith, there is
no presumed process-oriented immunity.

22. Id. at 968. As articulated by the Aronson court, the business judgment rule "is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors .. . acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
23. Caremark, 698 A.2d. at 968.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 971.
26. Sale, supra note 4, at 469.
27. In many ways, what the court did in Caremark was little more than to apply common law rules regarding corporate decision-making, which in simple terms meant that "[slo
long as the directors acted in subjective good faith, the courts avoided imposing liability."
Allen, supra note 6, at 1299. Even if this is true, for reasons that will become apparent
below, the Caremark court's emphasis on good faith redounded much further than traditional notions of director liability.
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The Delaware Supreme Court again broached the issue of good
faith in Scattered Corporation v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc,2"
further expanding the concept toward a separate, independent
duty. Like Caremark, the court's discussion of good faith took
place within the context of a director's duty of care.29 The determination at issue was whether a pre-suit demand had been
wrongfully refused by the board of directors."0 To assess "whether
a demand has been wrongfully refused, the [c]ourt looks only to
the good faith and the reasonableness of the investigation."3' For
the court, the "[flailure of an otherwise independent-appearing
board or committee to act independently is a failure to carry out
its fiduciary duties in good faith or to conduct a reasonable investigation."32 "Such a failure could," assuming the right facts, "constitute wrongful refusal."3
Regarding the court's good faith analysis, what merits attention
is that the court seemed to imbue the idea of good faith with some
semblance of independent significance. In establishing an analytical framework from which to assess the validity of a board's
demand refusal, the court posited good faith as the lynchpin
within that conceptual framework. By this presumption, good
faith works as a mechanism to ferret out improper board decisions, while still purporting to do no more than assess the propriety of the decision-making process. At this point, a lack of good
faith still does nothing more than eviscerate the protection of the
business judgment rule. Still, once denuded of process, all that
remains to be evaluated meaningfully is the substance (or quality)
of the board[]s decision, the decision-making process having already been sullied. Although perhaps somewhat circuitous and
abstract, this process is what ultimately allows the court to hypothesize about an independent-appearing board or committee
failing to act independently. Such an assessment, even if only hypothetical, requires the court to proffer some kind of value judg28. 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997).
29. Scattered Corporation,701 A.2d at 75-76.
30. Id. at 71, 75. The standard for reviewing the efficacy of pre-suit demand is
"whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the
directors are disinterested and independent [and] (2) the challenged transactions is otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
31. Scattered Corporation,701 A.2d at 75 (citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212
(Del. 1991) and Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990)).
32. Scattered Corporation,701 A.2d. at 75.
33. Id. Because the court ultimately concluded that the directors breached no fiduciary
duties, these were obviously not the right set of facts. See Id. at 76.
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ment, a judgment not limited to the procedural posturing of a
board (i.e., independent-appearing), but rather a substantive assessment of the decision itself (i.e., failing to act independently).
As such, good faith appears to have two purposes. First, it determines whether the business judgment rule is valid, and second, it
provides an in-road for a more substantive analysis of a board's
business decision, one that is process-oriented in name only.34
As if to mitigate its use of good faith as an independent standard of liability, the court, in noting the Court of Chancery's consideration of good faith, discussed a litany of procedural items that
3 5 Yet,
led to its conclusion that good faith existed in Scattered.
none of the factors, either alone or in combination, could possibly
lead to a conclusion that the board failed to act in good faith, since
such an assessment is inextricably intertwined with a qualitative
judgment about the efficacy of a particular decision and not the
decision-making process itself.36 The court's quixotic double-talk
does not, however, hide the import of its nuanced assessment of
good faith, for it suggests a desire to think of good faith less as a
conditional element of due care and more as an entity in and of
itself.
In the end, however, too much can be made of the court's invocation of good faith in Scattered. Despite giving more than a little
attention to good faith, the court still refused to excise good faith
entirely from its traditional due care context. As the court itself
concluded, "the pleaded facts confirm that the Executive Commit-

34. This accords well with what the court said in Caremark regarding good faith and
the duty of good faith. It stated, "compliance with a director0s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision...
apart from considerations of good faith or rationality of the process employed." Caremark,
698 A.2d at 967. Read together, then, the analysis by the Caremark and Scattered courts
positions good faith as both a means by which to evaluate the processes undertaken by the
board and an end to judge the substance of a board's decision.
35. Scattered Corporation,710 A.2d at 76. For the Court of Chancery, factors militating in favor of good faith were the following: "(a) the creation of a Special Committee; (b)
the fact that it interviewed 25 people as well as other people the plaintiffs had suggested
would corroborate their claims of wrongful conduct; (c) the findings by the Special Committee that claims made in the demand were unsubstantiated; and (d) the conclusion by the
Executive Committee, after 'careful consideration.'" Id.
36. This of course does not mean that the absence of certain factors, such as those articulated by the Court of Chancery, might not be evidence of a lack of good faith; but an
actual finding of a lack of good faith is itself a substantive assessment, though it may of
course have procedural overtones.
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tee's decision was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."37
Although not explicitly a case determined on the basis of a duty
of good faith, Emerald Partnersv. Berlin" is nevertheless a case
that contributes to an understanding of good faith's transformation into an independent standard of liability. Not only did the
court affirm the tripartite duties of care, loyalty, and good faith
imposed on corporate directors,3 9 but it also helped to spark the
evolution of good faith into a separate genre of culpability. Emerald Partners involved an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court
in which the issue was whether the Court of Chancery erred in
"not conducting an entire fairness analysis in its post-trial opinion."" To that end, the court stated that "we must decide when it
is appropriate procedurally to consider the substantive effect of a
Section 102(b)(7) provision, in a shareholder challenge to a transaction that requires a trial pursuant to the entire fairness standard of judicial review."4 ' The court "concluded that the Court of
Chancery was required to decide the issue of entire fairness at
trial."42
In reaching its conclusion, the court reiterated the basic tenets
of the business judgment rule and its central role in directors' fiduciary duties. For the court, "[iif the presumption of the business
judgment rule is rebutted.., the burden shifts to the director defendants to prove to the trier of fact that the challenged transaction was 'entirely fair' to the shareholder plaintiff." 3 The court's
holding also reaffirmed that the scope of Section 102(b)(7) was limMore imporited solely to a director's duty of care violations.
tantly, however, the court made clear that Section 102(b)(7) was
37. Scattered Corporation,701 A.2d. at 76. But cf Sale, supra note 4, at 471 (arguing
that the court more pointedly framed the case in terms of a duty of good faith than in terms
of a duty of care).
38. 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
39. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del.
1998)).
40. Emerald Partners,787 A.2d at 87.
41. Id. at 89-90.
42. Id. at 87.
43. Id. at 91 (citing Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1134, 1162 (Del. Ch. 1994); Cede
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)) (emphasis omitted). The court noted
that to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule, a plaintiff must show that
a director "violated any one of its triad of fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, or good faith."
EmeraldPartners,787 A.2d at 91 (citing Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1164).
44. Emerald Partners,787 A.2d at 91 (citing Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095
(Del. 2001) (holding that a complaint asserting only a duty of care violation is dismissible
pursuant to the proper invocation of§ 102(b)(7))).
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an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant in
order for its exculpatory provisions to materialize.45 The court's
justification for recognizing Section 102(b)(7) as an affirmative
defense was simple: "unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness
is unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate
director defendants from paying monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care.' 6 Interestingly, the court, in delineating the parameters of this affirmative
defense, conflated the provisions of Section 102(b)(7) with fiduciary standards of liability, effectively making them one and the
same. As such, "the breach or breaches of fiduciary duty upon
which substantive liability for monetary damages is based become
outcome determinative when the directors seek exculpation
through a charter provision enacted in accordance with Section
102(b)(7). "' 7
By turning Section 102(b)(7) into an affirmative defense, the
court created the foundational element for good faith liability,
since good faith ceased to be merely a charge capable of defeating
Section 102(b)(7) or the presumptions of the business judgment
rule and instead became a form of "substantive liability" that is
inexorably outcome determinative. In other words, a decision
found to be lacking in good faith not only defeats a defendant director's attempted invocation of Section 102(b)(7), but also, and at
the same time, it becomes a violation of the director0s fiduciary
duty of good faith. Thus, the court's holding in Emerald Partners
laid the foundation for the maturation of an independent duty of
good faith.
The Delaware Supreme Court again brushed up against the parameters of good faith in Brehm v. Eisner ("Brehm ,). 41 In Brehm
I, the issue was whether Disney's board of directors breached their
fiduciary duties in approving "an extravagant and wasteful Employment Agreement of Michael S. Ovitz as president" and "in
agreeing to a 'non-fault' termination of the Ovitz Employment
45. Emerald Partners,787 A.2d at 91-92. As defined by the court, "an affirmative defense is '[a] defendant's assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat
the plaintiffls . . .claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.'" Id. (quoting
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 430 7" ED. 1999), remanded to 2001 WL 11534 (Del. Ch. Feb. 07, 2001), vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001)).
46. Id. at 92.
47. Id. at 94 (citing Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1165, n.16).
48. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).

100
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Agreement.""' From the beginning, the court ostensibly framed
the issue as a duty of care case.5" As such, the court determined
that "the inquiry here is not whether we would disdain the composition, behavior and decisions of Disney's Old Board or New Board
...if we were Disney stockholders," since "[tihat determination is
not for the courts."5' Rather, "the sole issue that this [c]ourt must
determine is whether the particularized facts alleged in this Complaint provide a reason to believe that the conduct of the [two
Boards] constituted a violation of their fiduciary duties." 2
Although the court gave scant attention to the import of good
faith within the ambit of fiduciary relations, the little it did further pushed the concept toward an independent standard of fiduciary liability. For example, in discussing whether the test of corporate waste was met, the court opined that "if there is a good
faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste." 3 The court also
noted that
[d]ue care in the decision-making context is process due care
only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment
rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the
waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not
made in good faith, which is the key ingredient of the business judgment rule. 4
Like the previous cases in which courts examined good faith, the
court in Brehm I comes precipitously close to defining the outer
limits of good faith, namely, irrationality. Still, when positioned
within the case's entire context, it becomes clear that Brehm I's
articulation of good faith, while maturing in coherence, is still incapable of standing alone, because it remains focused solely on
process, the same focus as duty of care.
Yet, while clinging to a nominally due care evaluation, the court
nevertheless seems to broaden the potential reach of good faith as
49. Brehm I, 746 A.2d at 248-49. The breaches alleged in Brehm I involved two separate boards, one in 1995 (the "Old Board") and one in 1996 (the "New Board"). Id. at 248.
50. Id. at 255. As the court concluded, "[t]his is a case about whether there should be
personal liability of the directors of a Delaware corporation to the corporation for lack of
due care in the decision[-]making process and for waste of corporate assets." Id.
51. Id. at 256.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 263 (citing Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis
in original).
54. Brehm I, 746 A.2d at 264 (footnote omitted).
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a separate liability standard by equating its significance to that of
the duty of loyalty. As the court put it, "[the] directors' decision
will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or
lack independence relative to the decision, [or] do not act in good
faith ...., In other words, either interest or bad faith can fleece
the business judgment rule of its presumed protection. Even if
good faith remains as yet a subsection of due care, its significance
is singular. After all, once a business decision loses its presumed
validity, even the duty of care ceases to be only process oriented
and becomes, instead, substantively driven, concerning itself with
both the quality of the process and the efficacy of the decision itself. Thus, while still conditioned on due care, good faith's potential expanse is coupled with the duty of loyalty, which, in the end,
suggests that both the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith
allow a court to evaluate a board's business judgment on substantive grounds, gauging the quality of the decision ex post.
The Delaware Supreme Court extended its analysis of good faith
56 ("Brehm H"), a case
in In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation,
intimately related to the facts and issues of Brehm I" The issue
in Brehm H was "whether the [ directors of the Walt Disney
Company should be held personally liable to the corporation for a
knowing or intentional lack of due care in the directors' decisionmaking process regarding Ovitz's employment and termination."5 8
Although once again framed loosely as a due care case, the court
went a step further in positing good faith as the determinative
issue in the case. For the court, the plaintiffs allegations, went
beyond "merely negligent or grossly negligent decision-making by
corporate directors."5 9 Instead, the "complaint suggests that the
Disney directors failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill
their fiduciary duties to Disney and its stockholders."" In short,
the facts implied that "the Disney directors failed to 'act in good
faith and meet the minimal proceduralist standards of attention."'" ' In holding as such, the court seems to suggest that good
faith, as a standard of independent culpability, stands somewhere

55. Id. at 264, n.66.
56. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. 2003).
57. Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 278. Brehm H was ostensibly a repleaded complaint permitted by the court in Brehm I. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also supra note 10.
60. Id. n.61 (quoting Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052).
61. Id. at 278.

102
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beyond due care, a point where due care's negligence starts to
bleed into intent.
In their defense, the directors argued that Disney's charter provision, based on 8 Del. Ch. Section 102(b)(7), exculpated them
from monetary damages since this was only "a breach of the directors' duty of care." 2 The court pointed out, however, that since the
allegations raised a "reason to doubt whether the board's actions
were taken honestly and in good faith," the invocation of Section
102(b)(7) was improper because "acts or omissions not undertaken
honestly and in good faith... do not fall within the protective ambit of Section 102(b)(7)."63 Ultimately, the court found that the
plaintiffs had in fact alleged facts sufficient to escape summary
judgment.' As the court concluded, "[k]nowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with
appropriate care is conduct.., that may not have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interest of the company."" Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, "plaintiffs' new
complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of the directors' obligation
to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation's best interests. 66
In finding that the plaintiffs sustained their burden to overcome
a motion to dismiss, the court began in earnest the articulation of
good faith as an independent standard of liability. As the court
stated, "[0]ur corporation law's theoretical justification for disregarding honest errors simply does not apply to intentional misconduct or to egregious process failures that implicate the foundational directorial obligation to act honestly and in good faith to
advance corporate interests."6 7 What is perhaps most significant is
that the court's analysis rests squarely on the purported directors'
lack of good faith in its decision-making process. To justify its
holding, the court opined that "the law must be strong enough to
intervene against [an] abuse of trust."8 This statement, more
62. Brehm H, 825 A.2d at 286.
63. Id. For the court, a fact evincing a lack of good faith on the part of the directors
was that they "allowled] two close personal friends to control the payment of shareholder's
money to Orvitz." Id. at 287, n.30.
64. Id. at 289-90.
65. Id. at 289.
66. Id. at 289. The court re-articulated its holding by concluding that "[wihere a director consciously ignores his or her duties to the corporation, thereby causing economic injury
to its stockholders, the director's actions are either 'not in good faith' or 'involve intentional
misconduct.'" Id. at 90 (citing 8 Del. Code. § 102(b)(7)).
67. Brehm H, 825 A.2d at 291.
68. Id.
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than any other, evidences the court's motivation for thinking in
terms of a duty of good faith. Because the traditional bifurcated
world of director liability, duty of care, and duty of loyalty is perhaps deficient in scope to snare all ne'er-do-well corporate directors, there must be some way to inculpate those directors whose
behavior is so egregious that it confounds logic to countenance.
Given this conceptualization, the court transformed good faith
from a vehicle capable of removing the presumptions of the business judgment rule into a free-standing pillar of director liability
in Delaware corporation law. And as a free-standing pillar, the
court confirmed that the duty of good faith stands somewhere between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty: a penumbral point
beyond gross negligence, yet not necessarily contingent upon a
69
director's conflicted status.
With the foundation thus complete, the only thing that remained to ensconce the duty of good faith into a director's throng
of fiduciary responsibilities was a case that grounded a director's
liability on his breach of the duty of good faith. A case, in short,
that would use good faith as more than just a theoretical possibility or condition precedent. Emerging Communications was just
that case.
C.

Emerging Communications

The Delaware Chancery Court gave full realization to the import of good faith as an independent standard of director liability
in In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.°
Emerging Communications involved a "going private" transaction
between Emerging Communications, Inc. ("ECM") and Innovative
Communications Corporation, LLC ("Innovative"). According to
the Court of Chancery, the issue in Emerging Communications
was two-fold: first, whether a proposed transaction between ECM
and Innovative, the acquirer and ECM's majority stockholder, was
fair;7 and second, if the transaction was unfair, whether any ECM

70. This is not to suggest, however, that the duty of good faith is antipodal to the duty
of loyalty. As the court in Emerging Communications pointed out, a director may be liable
for breaching the duty of good faith and the duty of loyalty. See infra note 4.
N. o. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
71. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *2. The going private
transaction was a two-step "acquisition of the publicly owned shares of ECM by Innovative." Id. In the first-step, Innovative made a tender offer for 29% of ECM's outstanding
shares at $10.25 price per share. Id. The second step involved the acquisition of the re-
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directors were personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties to ECM's minority shareholders.7 2 To answer the questions
presented, the court subjected the privatization transaction to an
"entire fairness" analysis," since it found that a majority of ECM's
board of directors (the "Board") was not independent.7 4 After an
exhaustive review of various highly technical valuation schemes
presented by experts on both sides, the court concluded that the
$10.25 per share price was not fair.75 The court then proceeded to
analyze whether the processes used by the Board to arrive at the
$10.25 per share price evidenced fair dealing." Again the court
held that they did not.77
In holding that ECM's Board dealt unfairly with its minority
shareholders, the court concluded that both the full Board and the
Special Committee lacked independence.7 8 Specifically, the court
noted that Jeffrey Prosser, ECM's Chairman and CEO, directly
appointed all six members of ECM's Board.79 The court further
determined that a majority of the Board members were "economimainder of ECM's shares in a cash-out merger of ECM into an Innovative subsidiary, also
at $10.25 price per share. Id. at *2-3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *36. An entire fairness analysis consists of two-parts: fair price and fair
dealing. Id. See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A-2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (stating that
"[the] concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair price and fair dealing").
74. Emerging Communications,2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *120. For the court, "[a] critical aspect of any fair dealing analysis is the adequacy of the representation of the minority
stockholders' interests." Id. at *119-20.
75. Id. at *42. In evaluating the fair price, the court analyzed the experts' discounted
cash flow testimony. Id. Based on those valuations and its own assessment, the court
determined that $38.05 per share was the fair price at the time of the transaction. Id.
76. Id. at *116. As the court indicated, "[a] fair dealing analysis requires the [c]ourt to
address 'issues of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, and disclosed to the board, and how director and shareholder approval was obtained.'"
Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985)). Despite finding the
price unfair, the court decided that a separate fair dealing analysis was required, since it
was the only way to "identify the breach or breaches of fiduciary duty upon which liability
[for damages] will be predicated in the ratio decidendi of its determination that entire fairness has not been established." Id. at *103 (quoting Cinerama, 663 A.2d 1165 & n.16).
77. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *137. Although as the
court noted, directors' decisions can survive an entire fairness analysis when approved by a
majority of independent shareholders, the court determined that the shareholders' approval
in this instance was a nullity, since their "approvals were uninformed." Id. at *131. The
court based its conclusion on the "misdisclosures and omissions in the disclosure documents
sent to shareholders in connection with the Privatization." Id. at *133.
78. Id. at* 120.
79. Id. Prosser was not only ECM's Chairman and CEO, but he also wholly owned
Innovative Communication Company, LLC, which at the time owned 52% of ECM's outstanding shares and 100% of Innovative0s outstanding shares, an arrangement that effectively gave Prosser voting control over both ECM and Innovative, the two parties to the
transaction in question. Id. at *3.
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cally beholden to Prosser," a circumstance vitiating any and all
claims of director independence."° Importantly, because a majority
of directors were not independent, the court concluded that they
bore the burden to prove that the transaction was entirely fair, a
burden they ultimately failed to carry. 81
Once the court determined that the transaction was unfair, "the
court [had to] determine the nature of the fiduciary violation,"
whether of care, loyalty, or good faith, "that resulted in the unfair
transaction." 2 Only by first determining the nature of the fiduciary violation could the court "adjudicate which (if any) of the director defendants is liable for money damages, because ECM's §
102(b)(7) charter provision exculpates those directors found to
have violated solely their duty of care from liability for money
damages."83 In assessing the personal liability of the ECM directors, the court found two directors, John Raynor and Salvatore
Muoio, liable for breaching their fiduciary duties of loyalty and/or
good faith.84 Crucial to the court[]s finding of liability for Raynor
was not only that Raynor had worked in concert with Prosser in
the going private transaction, but also that at the time of the
transaction Raynor, Prosser's long-time attorney, received a $2.4
million compensation package for past services rendered from
Prosser, which was to be paid over five years -- a situation neither
Prosser nor Raynor ever disclosed to the Board." Given Raynor's
80. Id. at *120 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (noting that
directors who "through personal or other relationships are beholden to the controlling person," lack independence from that person)); see also Rales v. Blashand, 634 A.2d 927, 936
(Del. 1993) (noting that a director may lack independence if he is so thoroughly under the
influence of an interested party that the director's discretion could be seriously questioned).
81. Id. at *116, *137. The court also suggested that even had the board been independent, the "board's approval was not informed ... because the voting board members were
ignorant of the existence of the June Projections and of the inadequacy of the Houlihan
valuation that was based upon the March projections." Id. at 132.
82. Emerging Communications,2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *137-38.
83. Id. at *138. (citing Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001)). As noted by the
court, "Article Seventh of ECM's Certificate of Incorporation provides":
A director of the Corporation shall not be personally liable to the Corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability
(i) for any breach of the directors duty of loyalty, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, (iii) under Section 174 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
Id.
84. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, *140, *143. Although the
court also found Prosser personally liable for breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty, the
court predicated his liability on his status as controlling stockholder and not as a director.
Id. at *139.
85. Id. at *122, *140.
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role in the transaction, the court concluded he was liable "for
breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty and/or good faith."86
Although admitting some reluctance, the court also found Muoio
liable for breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty and/or good
faith.87 In assessing Muoio's personal liability, the court noted
that Muoio was unique among ECM's directors for a couple of reasons. First, "unlike Raynor, Muoio did nothing affirmatively to
assist Prosser in breaching his fiduciary duties."8 8 Second, Muoio
was the only ECM director who had not been appointed to the Innovative board after the privatization transaction. 9 Nevertheless,
the court determined that Muoio was an interested director, and
therefore, like the rest, he could not hide behind the presumptive
dictates of the business judgment rule.9" Muoio's conflicted status
stemmed from his past consulting arrangements with Prosser. At
the time of trial, for instance, Muoio had been "on an annual
$200,000 retainer for providing banking/financial advisory services" since mid-1997, a fact that led the court to conclude that
Muoio "viewed Prosser as a source of additional future income."9'
Furthermore, the court noted that in March 1998, "Muoio sought
up to an additional $2,000,000 for serving as financial adviser to a
potential acquisition by ECM of CoreComm Inc."92 Given the unyielding synergy between past and future business relationships,
in fact "beholden to Prosser,"
the court determined that Muoio was
93
director.
interested
an
was
thus
and
Perhaps more than any other factor, however, the court imputed
liability to Muoio "because he voted to approve the [going private]
transaction even though he knew, or at the very least had strong
reasons to believe, that the $10.25 per share merger price was unfair." 4 Unlike the other ECM directors, "Muoio possessed a spe-

86. Id. at *142. In examining Raynor's liability for breaching his duty of good faith, the
court said that Raynor [is] liable for "violating his duty of good faith for consciously disregarding his duty to the minority stockholders." Id.
87. Id. at *143. As the court put it: "The Court also concludes, albeit with reluctance,
that Muoio is similarly liable, even though [his] conduct was less egregious.. . ." Id.
88. Id.
89. Emerging Communication, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *22, n.12.
90. Id. at *125.
91. Id.
92. Id. For the court, this fact was relevant to Muoio's conflicted status because "[that
effort was unsuccessful only because the acquisition ultimately never took place." Id.
93. Id.
94. Emerging Communications,2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *143.
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cialized financial expertise."9 5 As a result of his expertise, the
court concluded that Muoio had "an ability to understand ECM's
intrinsic value that was unique to ECM board members."9 6 The
court placed significant weight on Muoio's own statement that
$10.25 per share was "at the low end of any kind of fair value you
would put."97 Given his expertise in the telecommunications industry and his own ability to make a fairness assessment, the
court opined that "it was incumbent upon Muoio, as a fiduciary, to
advocate that the board reject the $10.25 price," and that he
"should also have gone on record as voting against the proposed
transaction at $10.25 per share merger price. " "
Unfortunately for him, Muoio's own unique expertise also deprived him of a defense available to some of the other directors:
reliance on Houlihan's fairness opinion.99 Given that he purported
to rely on the fairness opinion in voting in favor of the merger, the
court determined that only impure motives could have led to
Muoio's vouchsafing for the proposed transaction. °0 But even if
Muoio arguably had pure motives, the court stated that it was his
burden, under 8 Del. Code Section 102(b)(7), to show that "[his]
failure to withstand an entire fairness analysis is exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care."' To the court, Muoio

95. Id. at *144. As the court indicated, Muoio was "a principal and general partner of
an investment advising firm, with significant expertise in finance and the telecommunications sector." Id. at *143. Moreover, "[firom 1995 to 1996, Muoio had been a securities
analyst for, and a vice president of, Lazard Freres & Co. in the telecommunications sector."
Id. Prior to that, from 1985 to 1995, Muoio was a securities analyst for Gabelli & Co., Inc.,
in the communications sector, and from 1993 to 1995, he was a portfolio manager for
Gabelli Global Communications Fund, Inc." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Muoio Dep. at 175). Muoio also "expressed to Goodwin his view that the
Special Committee might be able to get up to $20 per share from Prosser." Id. (citing
Goodwin Dep. Sept. 6, 2001 at 47). It should be noted, however, that the $10.25 per share
price was considered fair by Houlihan, which issued a fairness opinion at that price. See
Id. at *32, *145.
98. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *144.
99. Id. at *144-45. The court concluded that Muoio's reliance was ill-placed, since his
own "expertise in the industry was equivalent, if not superior, to that of Houlihan." Id.
"That expertise," the court stated, "gave Muoio far less reason to defer to Houlihan's valuations." Id. Also excluded from such reliance were Prosser and Raynor, ostensibly because
they were aware of the more aggressive June predictions. Id.
100. Id. at *145. Regarding Muoio's sanctioning of the proposed transaction, the court
stated: "The only explanation that makes sense is that Muoio, who was seeking future
business opportunities from Prosser, decided that it would disserve his interests to oppose
Prosser and become the minority's advocate." Id.
101. Id. at *146 (citing Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 98) (italics in original).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

liable for
failed to satisfy his statutory burden, rendering him 102
faith.
good
and/or
loyalty
of
duties
breach of his fiduciary
If, as the court said, Muoio placed his future personal business
interests above those of the minority shareholders, then he
breached his duty of loyalty to them.1 13 If, on the other hand, he
"consciously and intentionally disregarded his responsibility to
safeguard the minority stockholders from the risk, of which he had
unique knowledge, that the transaction was unfair," he breached
his duty of good faith.0 4 Importantly, in holding Muoio liable, the
court concluded that, regardless of any duty of loyalty violation,
Muoio's culpability could rest solely on his breach of the duty of
good faith.'0 ' In so holding, the court confirmed that the duty of
good faith is a separate and distinct standard of fiduciary liability,
one no longer contingent on one of the two other traditional fiduciary standards, care or loyalty.
D.

Muoio Compared to the OtherFour Directors (Goodwin, Ramphal, Todman, and Vondras)"6

When compared to the other directors, Richard Goodwin, Sir
Shridath Ramphal, Terrence Todman, and John Vondras, the true
import of the court's finding of a breach of the duty of good faith is
readily apparent: as a standard of director liability, the duty of
good faith bridges the gap between the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. It serves as a kind of fiduciary purgatory, connected at
each end to the duties of care and loyalty, yet capable of independent condemnation in between.
In terms of liability, the court characterized the conduct of the
Still, despite such resother directors as "highly troublesome."'
ervations, the court did not hold the remaining directors liable for
breaching either their duty of loyalty or their duty of good faith.'
Similar to Muoio, the court characterized at least two of the four
directors as interested directors.0 9 Moreover, all four directors
102. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *146-47.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *146-47.
106. Although Prosser and Raynal were also found liable, their liability is too far afield
from Muoio's to serve as any type of relevant comparison.
107. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *147.
108. Id. at *148.
109. Id. at *147. The court noted that Ramphal "fell into a lucrative consultancy with
Prosser," netting $140,000 in 1993 and 1994 and $120,000 in 1995, "amounts represent[ing]
22.5% of Ramphals' total income for that period." Id. at *123. For Vondras, the court con-
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voted to approve the merger transaction." ° That, according to the
court, none of the four "had a personal conflicting financial interest in, or derived a personal benefit from, that transaction to the
exclusion of the minority stockholders" distinguished them from
Muoio in a culpability-limiting way."' Significantly, the court determined that although conflicted and beholden to Prosser, none of
the remaining directors "knew or had reason to believe[] that the
merger price was unfair.""2 Given this, the court determined that
"there is no persuasive evidence that the fiduciary violations of the
ECM directors other than Prosser, Raynor, and Muoio implicated
conduct more egregious than a breach of their duty of care.""' And
as the court stated, "negligent or even gross negligent conduct,
however misguided, does not automatically equate to disloyalty or
bad faith.""4 For the court, since "there [was] no evidence that
[the directors] acted with conscious and intentional disregard of
their responsibilities, or made decisions with knowledge that they
lacked material information," their conduct did not "amount to a
breach of their fiduciary duty to act in good faith." 5 Thus, because they breached only their duty of care, each of the remaining
directors, whether conflicted or not, could avail themselves of the
exculpatory provisions based on Section 102(b)(7) as expressed in
Article Seven of ECM's Charter."'
As adumbrated by the court, the distinction between Muoio and
the exculpated directors goes to the heart of the duty of good faith
and proffers at least a preliminary test for the duty of good faith.
At bottom, a violation of a director's duty of good faith entails
cluded that $115,000, which he received for serving on ECM's Board and Special Committee, an amount representing 10% of his income in 1998, plus his expectation "to continue as
a director of Prosser entities and benefit from the substantial compensation which accompanied that status ... was sufficient to vitiate Vondras' independence." Id. at *126-27.
The court entertained, albeit skeptically, the notion that Goodwin and Todman might have
qualified as disinterested directors under Delaware law. Id. at *128.
110. Id.
111. Id. For whatever reason, the court chose to discount their future appointments to
the Innovative board as evidencing any potential conflict. Id. at *33. Also, that Ramphal
and his son-in-law, Sir Ronald Sanders, both had lucrative consulting arrangements with
Prosser, and that Sanders' arrangement was at risk should the Special Committee deny the
proposed transaction was insufficient to find Ramphal liable for breaching his duty of loyalty and/or good faith. Id. at *124, *152-53.
112. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *148. In this regard, the
court again noted that important, material information was withheld from the Board, the
Special Committee and Houlihan. Id. at *149.
113. Id. at *148.
114. Id. at *152.
115. Id. at*153.
116. Id. See also supra note 83.
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"conscious and intentional disregard of n responsibilities, or
mak[ing] decisions with knowledge that they lack[] material information." 1l7 To this extent, the court's invocation of the duty of
good faith serves as a means to ensnare directors whose behavior,
while not sufficiently disloyal, is simply too egregious to be even
grossly negligent. As such, the vaunted triad of fiduciary duties is
dismantled and what remains is simply a continuum of egregious
conduct in which some bad conduct is capable of statutory exculpation and some is not. Until the Delaware Supreme Court defines the precise nature of a director's duty of loyalty, the lines
separating care, loyalty, and good faith will perforce remain nebulous. All that we know from Emerging Communications is that a
director's expertise in a particular field is one possible avenue
leading directly to the duty of good faith. After all, Muoio's expert
knowledge required that he be held to a higher standard of conduct than his fellow directors, while at the same time it effectively
prevented him from claiming gross negligence.

III. CONCLUSION

The court's instantiation of the duty of good faith in Emerging
Communications is for the moment the final chapter in the concept's evolution from a means of denying the weighty presumptions of the business judgment rule through a means of preventing
statutory exculpation to a means of independently imputing director liability. Of course, the true fate of the fiduciary duty of good
faith remains to be seen. Should the Delaware Supreme Court
decide that the duty of loyalty does not require self-dealing, then
the need for a duty of good faith is negligible, and a return to the
traditional bifurcation of care and loyalty would most likely ensue.
But should the Delaware Supreme Court hold that the duty of
loyalty is predicated on some type of self-dealing, then the duty of
good faith will probably remain a free-standing pillar of director
liability under Delaware corporation law. l"' How this will affect
directors' willingness to serve on boards is also an open question.
117. Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *153.
118. As this writing goes print, another round of Disney shareholders' litigation is before
the Delaware Court of Chancery. Whether, and to what extent, the duty of good faith plays
a role in the case is uncertain; however, given its role in the previous Disney cases (Brehm I
and Brehm II), there is reason to think that the court will further delineate the contours of
the duty of good faith. See Chad Bray, Testimony Starts in Case by Disney Sharholders,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at B8.
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Whether, in fact, directors with unique, specialized information
about a particular industry will continue to seek appointment to
boards of directors in those industries is uncertain, since the
court's holding in Emerging Communications suggests that such
expertise carries with it a qualitatively higher standard of conduct, and one with potentially devastating personal costs.'19
In the wake of corporate scandals, ranging from Enron to Tyco
and beyond, the court's decision in Emerging Communications
should not come as a complete surprise. In a sense, it merely provides another anodyne to the ills that the untempered conduct of
corporate directors can inflict. 2 ' By suturing the gap between care
and loyalty, good faith might reasonably prevent the reopening of
old corporate wounds. In this sense, the Emerging Communications court appears to have erred on the side of more vigilance,
not less. At the very least, the court strongly suggests that the
status quo of Delaware corporation law is untenable.
David H. Cook

119. Regarding this point, Judge Norman Veasey, a recent retiree from the Delaware
Court of Chancery, expressed his doubt that a new, higher standard has been created for
directors "simply because they have knowledge and expertise in certain areas." Phyllis
Plitch, DirectorsGet Latitude, Judge Says, WALL ST.J., Oct. 27, 2004, at B2H.
120. As Judge Veasey stated: If directors claim to be independent by saying ... that
they base decisions on some performance measure and don't do so, or if they are disingenuous or dishonest about it, it seems to me that the courts is some circumstances could treat
their behavior as a breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith.
Phyllis Plitch, Directors Get Latitude, Judge Says, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at B2H.

